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FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
and
GENUINE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE
Conflicts of Interest 
By Reginald Herbold Green
We made South West. Why should we give it to you?
- Settler Proprietor to Namibian Employee
We do not believe in a system which sells people.
- Namibian Strikers
It must be borne in mind that the Namibian people are 
shedding blood to liberate each and every inch of the 
Namibian soil, thus each and every inch of Namibian land 
must and will belong to the Namibian people.
- S. Nujoma, President of SWAPO
What Do We Mean?
To discuss the interaction among foreign economic interests, the illegal 
regime in Namibia and the process of attaining genuine Namibian independence 
requires posing several definitional and/or conceptual questions.
First - what is a foreign enterprise or economic interest in Namibia? Fairly 
clearly South African firms or territorial subsidiaries controlled by them are 
foreign economic enterprises. So too are economic instrumentalities of the 
South African state. Economic instrumentalities (including enterprises) 
controlled by the authorities installed in Windhoek by South Africa are also
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. for this purpose classified as foreign because they are controlled by
Pretoria. Presumptively both in respect to such economic units and - slightly 
less certainly - economic units directly controlled by the South African state 
there would be an automatic shift at independence.
Expatriates (persons who view a country other than Namibia as their basic home 
and place of retirement) are also clearly foreign. Settlers who view Namibia 
as their territorial home are a more ambiguous category. Arguably those 
(whether White or Coloured) who would choose to remain in a genuinely 
independent Namibia are more domestic than foreign. Severe problems arise in 
separating (guessing the future separation) among expatriates, 'transient* 
settlers and 'domestic' settlers.
Second - what is the interaction of economic importance from a national 
accounts or economic structure perspective; of objective support for the 
occupation regime (e.g. by paying taxes) and of subjective attitudes relative 
to the occupation regime and to genuine independence? These are not 
necessarily homogenous categories since for security purposes numbers matter; 
for economic structure total value added and/or exports are dominant; for 
occupation regime taxable income or consumption and for attitudes toward the 
future, calculation of long term economic (and in the case of individuals 
social and political) interest.
Third, to what degree do external economic interests in Namibia influence 
their home governments either by overt pressure or simply by their existence? 
The existence of RSA economic interests clearly is significant as are the 
pressures (perhaps more political than economic) exerted by a majority of the 
RSA white expatriate/settler community. In other cases the links are much 
more tenuous and in one - that of Federal Germany - mixed in direction, i.e. 
some are in favour of genuine independence.
Fourth, excluding South Africa, what steps by what governments could in fact 
be influenced by their enterprises, nationals or compatriates in Namibia and 
how? For example, it is by no means self-evident that the USA economic 
interests (now relatively peripheral to Namibian production or tax base and at 
least as marginal to the USA companies involved) could exert much leverage 
over USA policy toward Namibia. Economic concerns, kith and kin links and 
strategic/ideological goals or fear are present in the Namibia policies and
*
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perspectives of all the states with economic interests there. It is by no 
means certain that the direct economic element is dominant in any case and 
clear that it is not dominant in certain cases.
It is in general much easier to demonstrate the dominance of external economic 
interests in Namibia and to the occupation regime's revenue plus RSA's balance 
of payments than to posit ways in which they could actually cause significant 
state policy changes even if they were so minded. However, this is an area 
requiring attention if one main purpose of the appraisal of foreign economic 
interests' present role is perceived as altering their roles/impact during the 
ongoing struggle for genuine Namibian independence.
What Foreign Interests? With What Significances?
The core of private enterprise interests in Namibia are controlled by the 
South African oligopoly groups. In Namibia, as in South Africa, their largest 
member is the Anglo American Group (including De Beers and arguably First 
National, ex-Barclays). It is the sole diamond producer (Consolidated Diamond 
Mines) and via Consolidated Goldfields probably has effective control over the 
largest base metal producers - Tsumeb/Otjihase/SWACO - when it chooses to 
exert it. First National is the largest bank by a substantial margin. Other 
Anglo Group interests include substantial (but not dominant) stakes in 
fishing, construction and rental office/commercial property. The total 
Namibian interests of the Anglo Group are significant (especially in respect 
to diamonds) but are under 5Í of its probable global assets and operations.
Other South African enterprises dominate meat packing, karakul trading, 
probably shipping plus clearing and forwarding (SAFMarine), construction and 
large scale road haulage. A majority of banking and insurance is in other RSA 
private enterprise hands as are a number of manufacturing enterprises. The 
largest single one is Stanswa - the branch of The Standard Bank of South 
Africa (no longer effectively controlled by Standard and Chartered of the UK). 
In no single case is the Namibian operation a large per cent of Namibia's GDP 
albeit taken together the stake is substantial. In each case it would appear 
to be quite small relative to the total operations of the South African parent 
group. This was not true of the fishing enterprises before their overfishing 
wrecked the Namibian industry but holds for them too today.
The second largest enterprise group is that comprising South African state and 
nominally the occupation ’SWA/Namibia* regime ventures. These include a large 
(controlling for voting purposes) stake in uranium (Rossing), some secondary 
base metal mines, the largest segment of manufacturing (via First National 
Development Corporation), a significant petroleum distribution stake and a 
monopoly position in hydrocarbon exploration, dominance in housing and 
development finance, a secondary motor transport role plus railways, 
electricity and water.
Non-South African TNC's have a more limited role. While hundreds can be 
listed as having an office or agents or present/past mineral explorations, the 
number of ventures of any size even relative to the Namibian economy, let 
alone to their parent groups’ operations, is very small indeed. The major 
case is that of the RTZ group (UK) which is the major equity holder in Rossing 
in financial terms as well as its manager. Newmont (USA) is the second 
largest shareholder (after Consolidated Goldfields) in Tsumeb and currently 
provides its management. Up to 10Í of RTZ’s net profits accrue from Rossing. 
If Tsumeb returns to profitability (as it may well have in 1987) the same 
might be true of Newmont. Shell, BP and Metal Box (UK via their RSA 
subsidiaries) are significant in petroleum product importation and 
distribution and in container production for Namibia, but miniscule compared 
to group global operations. The same is true of French and German concerns 
other than uranium users/power companies whose interest lies more in security 
of supply - a situation even more true in the case of Japan.
Settlers number perhaps 40,000 (of whom 10,000 to 25,000 might remain at least 
for some years after genuine independence). They dominate the livestock 
sector (cattle, karakul) as well as the commercial and maintenance ones and 
have minority segments in manufacturing, road haulage and fishing plus a 
peripheral bank. A small majority are South African and almost all the rest 
German by origin.
Expatriates also number around 40,000 (excluding South African military and 
police personnel) and are predominantly South African by origin. They are 
occupation regime, South African/occupation regime state enterprise, and South 
African and foreign private enterprise functionaries and managers more or less 
in that order in terms of numbers.
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A potentially important sixth group is external lenders. In practice this 
group now appears to be almost solely South African financial institutions and 
to have virtually total guarantees of its lending by the RSA Treasury. 
External loans for specifically Namibian (public or private) projects appear 
virtually totally retired while - despite occupation regime claims - non-RSA 
bank uptake of 'SWA/Namibia1 paper at present seems to be minimal (probably 
concentrated on private and secondary banks and their clients in Switzerland 
and Federal Germany).
For purposes of this resume Walvis Bay - in accordance with geographic, 
historic and economic reality as well as United Nations resolutions - is 
treated as an integral part of Namibia. Deep sea fishing (beyond territorial 
waters) is, however, excluded because in the absence of a decree by the United 
Nations Council for Namibia it is not clear that the "economic zone" waters 
are now an integral part of Namibia. Further, the predominant foreign deep 
sea fishing fleets (USSR and Spain) do not provide material support for RSA or 
its occupation regime by their activities and, especially in the former case, 
are clear supporters of genuine Namibian independence.
Excluding government proper, the approximate shares of Gross Territorial 
Product flowing from foreign economic interest activities are:
A. South African Oligopolies (of which Anglo: 25-27s?) 35-42^?
B. South African and Occupation Regime Ventures 17¿-25?
C. Other TNCs 10-15?
D. Settlers (of which potentially domestic: 7s-12s?) 175-20?
E. Expatriate 2-4?
9^-96%
Balance for Black Namibians 4-6?
(Wages and salaries are classed as part of the employing sector not 
of that to which the employees belong.)
These figures are not very precise. In particular division of Rossing between 
Other TNC's and South African/Occupation Regime State Enterprises and of 
Tsumeb between Anglo and Other TNC's is problematic. However, they do
represent fairly firm relative orders of magnitude.
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As the occupation regime is South African and derives its revenues 
predominately from categories A through F above (including direct taxes on 
their employees' income and indirect on their expenditure) plus transfers and 
loans from South Africa, it could logically also be categorised as an external 
interest. In that case 97%—98% of the Namibian economy is foreign controlled 
and operated. Black Namibian controlled production is trivial and extends 
only marginally beyond production for own use, minimal agricultural production 
for sale and petty artisanal and service units at an individual or household 
level. The exceptions can be numbered at most in scores and even they are at 
best of small or medium scale even compared with the middle-sized settler 
ranch or commercial enterprises.
Foreign Enterprise and Individual Roles
The foreign enterprises and the settlers created the present Namibian economy 
over the past century. Nowhere has there been less space for black people to 
act on their own or to choose their response. That lack of space and of 
choice has been enforced by the state not merely through residence and 
employment control but through systematic despoilation of black Namibians of 
any natural resource base (or effective independent access to markets or 
finance) from which to take initiatives or make choices. That enforcement 
has been - for enterprises and settlers - the nexus of their mutual interest 
with the South African state (a nexus not as homogenously firm today as it was 
a decade or a decade and a half ago). On the state's side the enterprises 
provided tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings and the settlers security 
plus some revenue and foreign exchange. The expatriates - while at least 50% 
of the white residents at any one time - are largely consequential on 
enterprise, settler and state interests albeit they have become over time a 
particularly intransigent pressure group against genuine independence and one 
whose potential interaction with the right wing white opposition in RSA gives 
(or is asserted by RSA to give) them power out of proportion to their numbers 
or basic economic significance.
The actors have shifted marginally - especially in relative weight - over 
time. Before the mid-1940s this was within an insignificant economy 
(absolutely and relative to South Africa). The creation of the 'modern' 
Namibian economy dates basically to the three decades between 19^7 and 1977.
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Since then it has been in a series of stagnation, decline and stagnation 
crises related both to the world economy’s evolution and natural disasters and 
to the costs and uncertainties which the colonial economy bears as a result of 
SWAPO’s nearly three decades old struggle for genuine Namibian independence 
and particularly its intensification of that struggle from the mid-1970s.
Before 19^7 the enduring bedrock (or sandbank) of the colonial economy was 
settler ranchers. They were not prosperous, indeed both as to settlers and 
expatriates Namibia - after the South African conquest - was at least as much 
a safety valve for poor white relocation as an economic zone.
Mining was highly cyclical. Diamonds together with base metals became the 
economic backbone of German South West Africa's economy but both declined to 
very low levels of production or total closure for much of the late 1920s 
through 19*15. Prices accounted for this as to base metals while De Beers 
bought the diamond concession to control global output and then - as now - 
used Oranjemund (CDM) as a swing producer with sharp cuts when world market 
gluts threatened but quite high production at peaks.
In the 19*J0s Amax/Newmont pioneered the revival of base metal production while 
De Beers built up CDM to a major global gem producer. RTZ (two decades later 
after the Mandate’s revocation) brought Rossing into production. Fishing was 
developed (and nearly destroyed by reckless overcatching) over the same period 
basically by RSA firms but with substantial initial indirect US TNC
involvement. Settlers meanwhile more than doubled in numbers (from Germany as 
well as South Africa) and became prosperous in ranching (with a good world
karakul market and large, if erratic, beef export quotas to RSA) and in the
burgeoning commercial and service sectors.
Other foreign enterprise involvement followed in the wake of these main 
currents. The RSA/Occupation Regime state enterprise role was partly 
supportive (infrastructural) and partly interventionist (e.g. uranium plus 
base metals and FNDC) as at home in RSA.
The foreign enterprise sector and secondarily the settlers provided the 
investment to start the production takeoff. This in turn fuelled both
enterprise and settler investible surplus and public revenues. From the early 
1960s until the late 1970s, Namibia was a net capital exporter, i.e. domestic
savings exceeded domestic investment (private plus public). But on average
30? of Gross Domestic Product was remitted as dividends, interest, loan 
repayments and individual settler or expatriate savings so that retained 
territorial savings for the enterprise sector tended to be below investment, 
creating an apparent structural need for continued capital inflows. Over this 
period Namibia generated very large investible surpluses (from remittances) as 
well as foreign exchange surpluses (Namibia exported dominantly abroad and 
imported dominantly from RSA) for RSA.
Thus over 1947-1977 the South African state and economy and the foreign 
enterprise/settler interests in Namibia did well out of the territory (though 
not by doing good for its people). So long as business boomed, tax revenues - 
especially on mining and most especially on diamonds - were buoyant enough to 
cover territorial state expenditure with personal direct and indirect taxes 
rather low and RSA transfers and borrowing (excluding that really representing 
customs duty foregone) negligible or negative. Few conflicts between the 
state and the enterprises/ settlers were apparent. The state's security 
forces kept the border war away, repressed union activity, de facto 
maintaining the old 'contract' labour allocation / wage depression mechanism 
(albeit a minority of larger employers with more need of a skilled, stable 
labour force and more concerned with long term labour relations began to have 
doubts about the 'contract'/ no union system's cost/benefit calculus for 
them).
This harmony has eroded with the rise of the liberation struggle and the 
decline of the economy. The territorial budget is in deficit because of the 
economic decline, the costs of creating a moderate wage black elite and 
parallel puppet governments in a "buy a bantustan" strategy and the escalation 
of the bills to finance maintenance of repression. RSA loses heavily on 
Namibia at net surplus levels (perhaps 10? of RSA state expenditure) and at 
best breaks even on external account. In narrow economic terms Namibia no 
longer pays. For most foreign enterprises it still pays (especially with 
partial metal and diamond market recoveries) but is no longer a bonanza, 
especially as they too have in many cases sought to buy a future by creating a 
middle income minority black labour elite. Settlers have been squeezed as 
have expatriates, heightening their always latent right wing populist 
antipathy to big business and big government but also causing a settler 
minority (largely German among whom it may be a majority) to begin to consider
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genuine independence as potentially less bad than the status deteriorandis. A 
handful of companies - notably CDM and perhaps First National and Stanswa, 
though notably not Tsumeb nor Rossing- have begun to toy with the same idea. 
On the other hand objectively neither the settler minority (excluding a 
handful of individuals) nor the enterprise sector has done anything 
significant to undermine the occupation regime's revenue and power to repress.
The Legal Context - A Semi Aside
The legal position of foreign enterprises, of the South African state and - 
less clearly - of settlers in an independent Namibia would be exceedingly 
tenuous albeit not totally uniform. Their continued enjoyment of any 
significant portion of their present incomes would be dependent on negotiated 
agreement with an independent Namibian government. SWAPO has made it clear 
that it would welcome such negotiations and believed that in many cases a 
mutually accepted new set of arrangements could be found. With the possible 
exception of some German settlers, this position has not been responded to in 
any serious way, even informally, by the foreign economic interests.
Pre 1966 (i.e. pre Mandate Revocation) settler and enterprise property in
Namibia is - or at least was - lawful. The consequences of the International 
Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 1971 (e.g. as to whether payment of taxes 
to the RSA occupation regime is a good discharge of liability) and of the UN 
Council for Namibia's Decree No. 1 in respect to natural resources (which 
presumably include livestock and fish albeit the stress has been on minerals 
generally and uranium in particular) raise questions even as to these assets.
Any post 1966 investments turning on RSA/occupation regime actions are - per 
the UN and the ICJ - without valid legal status. As this includes mining 
right extension, by 1990 Rossing and Otjihase (void ab initio) and CDM (whose 
pre-1966 rights expire in 1990) will have no legal basis. The same holds for 
fishing and for any land use rights transferred after 1966.
All RSA/Occupation Regime assets (state or enterprise) in or created for the 
use of Namibia would appear to vest without liability in the Namibian state on 
independence. That is the result prescribed in the international convention 
on rights and duties on state succession. It is also the accepted
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international practice which began at the independence of Tanzania and is 
sometimes termed the "Nyerere Doctrine”.
The cumulative impact of these legal realities is to place the foreign 
enterprise and - given its very heavy dependence on state services and 
subsidies - settler agricultural sector in a very weak formal position in any 
independent Namibian state and an especially weak one against a genuinely 
independent Namibian state led by SWAPO.
The State and the Foreign Private Sector Today
Objectively foreign enterprise and settler production and earnings keep the 
colonial economy operating and provide (directly or indirectly) at least 95% 
of tax revenue. Similarly a substantial portion of the 'security' focus of 
the occupation regime are drawn from the settler and expatriate communities 
while most companies are de facto part of its information and civil repression 
apparatus as are many individual settlers/expatriates.
Subjectively there is rather less homogeneity. Enterprises (except settler 
ones) in general would prefer to jettison apartheid to salvage capitalism. 
Almost all expatriates and a majority of settlers vehemently disagree, indeed 
are to the right of P. W. Botha and his occupation regime.
Security service repression bothers (unequally) many enterprises because they 
see it as increasing disorder today and violence tomorrow ie it prevents the 
emergence of either a 'safe' neo-colonial state or a modus vivendi with a 
genuinely independent Namibian state. Some settlers and a few expatriates 
share this view. But very few enterprises or individuals have taken steps to 
shield black Namibians from repression (among major enterprises CDM has 
perhaps gone furthest) and even these very cautiously and with a low profile.
Most enterprises - notably Tsumeb and Rossing - let alone most settlers are 
bitterly anti-union. The one clear major exception is CDM which sees valid 
worker representatives to bargain with (to bargain toughly with one might add) 
and black skilling as key to present and potential future profitability.
Most enterprises, expatriates and settlers would like to see an amiable,
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enduring neo-colonial solution with some income redistribution as its price 
but minimal changes in economic power and surplus division structures. (So 
for that matter would RSA.) An increasing number, however, doubt that such an 
objective is attainable.
Therefore many German and a few South African settlers, a handful of 
expatriates and a minority of enterprises (led by CDM - but not including the 
other presumptively Anglo controlled giant Tsumeb - and perhaps including 
First National and Stanswa) are willing to envisage genuine independence and 
to give gratuitous public lectures presumptively aimed at SWAPO on how to 
manage it after it happens. Actually doing anything to further it or to 
undermine the occupation regime's power is - except for a handful of dedicated
individuals - notable by its absence.
To this record of objective support for and muted, if any, opposition to the 
occupation regime there is one notable exception. Private enterprise 
investment in Namibia from the late 1970's has (after depreciation) been 
negative and Rossing and Otjihase were the last major external enterprise 
investments with no successors in sight a decade later. The uncertainty 
resulting from the mandate revocation, the ICJ ruling and the liberation 
struggle have interacted with the weakening profit results in Namibia to 
achieve that. As a result the growth of the colonial economy's productive 
sectors has been blocked - indeed they are running down. In that sense 
foreign enterprises are casting a vote of no confidence in the future of the
occupation regime by so doing gradually eroding the economic and revenue bases
for its survival. While useful in the context of the liberation struggle 
today this will pose real problems after genuine independence as in Namibia's 
mineral sector only Rossing and CDM have exhaustion dates on proven and 
developable deposits beyond 2000. Similarly, both ranching and fishing assets 
and infrastructure are not being restored or maintained up to the levels of 
depreciation from wear and tear plus ageing in the economic sense. A similar 
pattern in Rhodesia over 1975-79 has put severe pressure on the Zimbabwean 
economy and, in particular, its balance of payments.
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How Much Influence on Outside States?
It is easy to overestimate foreign enterprise and settler leverage on their 
home states (with South Africa an exception in the expatriate/settler case).
RSA concerns almost certainly centre on strategic security at home and on the 
political/psychological impact of ’losing Namibia' to genuine independence on 
both white politics and black struggle in RSA.
The USA’s direct economic concerns in Namibia are trivial. Further it has 
stated it would not support the main one - Tsumeb - against claims by an 
independent Namibia. Ideology, regional geo-political strategy and (less 
clearly) economic interests in South Africa dominate present administration 
Namibian policy while the rather different Congressional policy turns on 
domestic US political concerns and, in any event, has no clear Namibian focus.
The UK has been influenced by RTZ and by trade interests. Alone of states 
with significant economic concerns with Namibia its policy may well turn 
largely on enterprise interest and predominately on that of one company RTZ. 
Why a major component of the UK's regional policy should be held hostage in 
this way is perhaps unclear even in the historical context of RTZ-UK 
Government-UK Atomic Energy sector linkages, but the probable reality remains.
Germany is, on balance, influenced in favour of genuine Namibian independence 
by its settlers. Its main commercial companies in the atomic energy sector 
also appear to believe they could live with a SWAPO government, as their 
concerns turn on continued production and commercial sale of uranium oxide. 
There is right wing pressure in the opposite direction but it has not been 
dominant since 1980.
Arguably elements in the EEC complex support genuine independence for Namibia 
for reasons which are partly economic. EEC would be the natural supplier of 
perhaps 50% of Namibia’s imports and South Africa of 10 to 15% since the 
natural external trade links of Namibia are by sea and transport costs from 
the Rand are often as high as from Europe. Under South African occupation 75í 
of Namibia's imports are South African and perhaps 15i from EEC. The implied 
market gain of perhaps $175-200 million a year for EEC exporters is not huge 
but neither is it negligible. Equal access to the Namibian market requires
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genuine Namibian independence (just as effective access to several SADCC 
markets requires an end to RSA's destabilisation and a reduction in its 
economic coercive powers over them) - therefore EEC and its exporters 
collectively do have an interest in speeding the demise of the occupation 
regime.
What Action Should Be Sought? To Do What?
It is easy to assert that settlers and foreign enterprises both morally and in 
their own long term economic interests should both withdraw support from the 
occupation regime and act - at least in public word and negotiation with the 
UN Council and/or SWAPO as well as with trade unions and church leaders - to 
further genuine independence. It is rather harder to define practicable 
targets or how those which are practicable would undermine the repressive or 
strengthen the liberating forces significantly.
Surely if all settlers and foreign enterprises left tomorrow, the economy 
would collapse and be very hard to resuscitate. If they refused to pay direct 
taxes the fiscal blood-letting would be expensive to RSA. But is this 
realistic? RSA would seize assets and flows of funds and replace individuals. 
Is it credible to suppose a genuinely independent Namibia would actually make 
good such losses? Surely not to the enterprises or settlers.
South African businesses are notably timorous in trying to shift state policy 
and not notably successful when they do try. In the USA case enterprise 
influence is probably trivial and in the German perhaps mildly positive. Only 
in the UK case could an enterprise change of stance have any major potential 
impact on state policy. As RTZ is unlikely to be converted to supporting (or 
stopping opposing) genuine independence even at verbal level, the only evident 
way to achieve a shift would be by concerted Australian - Canadian - Papua New 
Guinean pressure aimed at RTZ’s group members in their countries (collectively 
much more important than Rossing).
What may be more generally attainable targets are:
a. training, promoting and housing black Namibians on a more genuinely 
equal opportunity basis;
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b. genuine negotiation with the legitimate trade unions in Namibia 
(beginning with recognising them);
c. dialogue with Christian bodies in Namibia leading to concrete social and 
economic action as well as some degree of condemnation of apartheid and 
repression now and exploration of future steps;
d. withdrawal of support for repression, provision of militia and informing;
e. dialogue - preferably publicly but at least privately - with the UN 
Council for Namibia and SWAPO on the possible roles of settlers and 
foreign enterprises in a genuinely independent Namibia and on what steps 
(including public statements) need to taken now to safeguard these 
possibilities.
That agenda will not liberate Namibia nor even make a major contribution to 
doing so. To expect more from the foreign enterprise/settler community would, 
however, be pure romanticism. Moreover, the results of substantial progress 
in the agenda would be more than trivial. The proposed dialogues and actions 
would strengthen genuine Namibian organisations at home and abroad objectively 
and in terms of their self confidence and sense of making progress. Similarly 
they would at least marginally weaken the repressive power and information 
collection capacities of the occupation regime and heighten its, and its 
supporters, fears that the 'holding' of Namibia would become increasingly 
costly economically and politically over time. Finally the proposed actions 
could create a basis for a less bumpy economic and personpower transition and 
continuity process at independence; by no means a negligible consideration.
The final question is how to convince the enterprises and settlers. So far as 
this means rational persuasion as to their real future interests, it is a 
means which can only be carried out by the Liberation Movement and its 
Namibian supporters whether in or outside of Namibia. Friends and allies can 
at most ease the way to initial contacts and provide some evidence from other 
cases to prove that genuine independence and Armageddon for foreign 
enterprises and settlers are by no means necessarily identical and are least 
likely to be so when there is a pre-independence basis of dialogue and of at 
least some mutual respect and acceptance.
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To the extent convince means to create a context in which the costs of 
continuing to oppose the genuine independence of Namibia are seen as rising to 
unacceptable levels, somewhat different considerations apply. The roles of 
the Liberation Movement, of the trade unions and of the churches of Namibia 
remain central. However, external government and pressure group action 
(analogous to that which has deterred new investment in, secured some 
withdrawals from and seriously upset businesses based in South Africa) can be 
effective. Who and where depends on the company. Shell and BP globally (and 
perhaps especially in the South where plenty of less RSA linked competitors 
would be happy to replace them?). Newmont in the USA, RTZ in Australia, 
Canada and Papua New Guinea, Anglo-De Beers-Con Gold Fields via the European 
and North American members of the group. Such a strategy would require 
detailed studies not a single paper. These are worth doing if actors exist or 
can be mobilised to implement them either because of a specific concern with 
working in support of Namibian independence or as part of wider commitment to 
regional liberation comprehending South Africa and the independent states of 
Southern Africa as well as Namibia.
Table 1
1983 Gross Domestic Product 
Sector___________ RSA Estimate Coverage Adjustment1 Revised Estimate %
Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing,
Hunting 143 95 238 12
Mining Ü7¿  5 478 24
Primary _6j_6 _100 71_6 ¿6
oManufacturing-^ 94 4o 134 65
Construction 64 15 79 4
Electricity & Water 61 10 71 3^
Secondary 291 HI 284 r{^ _
Transport and
Communications 97 23 120 6
Trade & Accom­
modation 235 42 277 14
Financial and
Business Services 125 10 135 7
Other Services 88 30 118 6
General Government 340 25 365 18
885 T 3Ó 1015 U
Tertiary Sector
GDP (at factor cost) 1720______________ 295 2015 100
Notes:
1. Coverage Adjustment Includes Household Self Provisioning (food, fuel, 
house construction), artisanal - semi-formal - small scale formal 
undercount, domestic service and Walvis Bay.
a. Household Self Provisioning (R 75m)
Crops R 15m Fuel R 15m
Stock R 30m Hunting, Gathering R 5m
Dairy R 15m Stock Losses (-15m)
Primary Sector R 65m
Housing - Estimated on basis 200,000 rural dwellings, 5 year 
average life; R 250 average labour content.
Secondary Sector R 10m
b. Undercount (R 30m)
Artisanal Manufacturing R 10m
Transport R 3 m
Rental/Housing/Rooming and Trade R 17m
c. Domestic Service (R 20m)
35-40,000 at R 500-600
d. Walvis Bay (R 170m)
Fishing R 30m Transport-Communications R 20m
Salt R 5m Trade and Accommodation R 25m
Manufacturing R 30m Financial, Business Services R 10m
Construction R 5m Other Services R 10m
Electric/Water R 10m General Government R 25m
2. Includes smelting, refining.
3 . Includes meat packing, fish processing.
Sources: Adapted from Statistical and Economic Review 1984; methodology based
on Green, R. H., et al Namibia: The Last Colony, 19 81; fragmentary and/or 
sectoral data ’subsistence’ (self provisioning), forestry, fishing and fish 
processing, port, domestic service.
Table 2
Domestic and National Product: 1946 - 1983 (R 000,000)
Year GDP GNP1 GNP as * GDP2
1946 22.2 20.4 92*
1950 61.0 46.4 76%
1954 107.2 74.4 70%
1956 141.6 85.1 60%
1958 121.3 83.2 69%
1962 146.7 104.1 71%
1969 368.9 278.0 75%
1977 1135.0 710.0 63%
1983 2000.0 1600-1680 80-84*
1985 2900.0 2250-2400 77-83*
Notes:
1. Methods of estimating factor payments and remittances vary. 1946-62 data
are comparable with each other and probably roughly comparable with 1977
and 1983. 1969 is apparently on a basis likely to increase the GNP/GDP
ratio by a least 5$.
2. Excluding 1969 (see Note 1) the swings correspond to degree of economic
and especially enterprise surplus) buoyancy. This improved steadily over
1946-1957, worsened sharply 1958-60, recovered 1960-1977 and worsened 
radically from 1978 (and especially 1980) onward.
Sources:
a. 1946-1962 Odendaal Report, Pretoria, 1964.
b. 1969 'Desert Deadlock' Financial Mail, 2-III-73*
c. 1977 Table 14, Namibia: The Last Colony (Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen),
London, 1981.
d. 1983 GDP and BOP Tables revised from UNIN, 1986; 1985 GDP adjusted in
same manner.
Table 3
Income Distribution: 1977—19831 (R 000,000)
Household Incomes
Wages/Salaries
Gross Operating Surpluses'
Jan Use Production 
Large Enterprise Gross Operating 
Surpluses 
GDP at Factor Cost
Distribution of Household Incomes 
White
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use
Number of Households2 
Average per Household (R)
Black 'Elite ,3
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use pNumber of Households 
Average per Household (R)
Black Worker/Peasant 
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use
Number of Households 
Average per Household (R)
1977
700
450
200
50
435
1135
500(71?)
320
175
5
45,000(13?)
11,100
47(7?)
30
15
2
22,500(6?)
12,100
153(22?)
100
10
1 1282 ,500(81?)
540
1983
1445
1127s
205
555
2000
835(58?)
700
125
10
40,000(10?)
20,875
305(21?)
240
60
5
50,000(12*?)
6,100
305(21?)
187*
20
_97¿
310,000(77*?)
1^000
Total
Household Incomes 
Households
Average per Household (R)
700
350,000
2,000
1,445
400,000
3,600
Notes:
1. Includes depreciation (estimated at R130 million 1977 and R313 million 
1983).
2. Rough estimate. May overstate number of white households. In respect to
black worker/peasant households, divided households are treated as
separate units thus adjustment from 6 to 4 average household size.
3. In 1977 basically workers in large mines plus limited number of
professionals, small businessmen, government employees, large scale 
non-mining enterprise employees. Rapid growth relates to upgrading of 
government black salaries, proliferation Second Tier posts, enterprise 
attempts to be seen as "equal opportunity" employers.
Sources:
1977 adjusted from Table 15 in Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen; 1983 adjusted 
from 1984 Statistical/Economic Review and 1983/84 Budget to correspond to 
adjusted GDP. Wage/Salary level estimates based on incomplete micro data 
for some categories and posts.
Namibian External Accounts 1977-83 (R 000,000)^
Table 4
1977 1983
Exports 800 1060
Goods 775 1005
Non Factor Services 25 55
Imports 650- 1170-
Goods 550 1000
Non Factor Services 100 170
Trade Balance Surplus/(Deficit) 150 (110)
2Factor Payments/Remittances ¿40-420 320-370
Recorded Interest/Dividends^ 140 120"
Unrecorded Enterprise Remittances 75-100 50-75
Wage-Salary-Small Business ,
Remittances 125-150 150-175
Basic Current Account Balance (Deficit) (190-270) (430-480)
0
Government/Railways Transfer Receipts 75 625
Capital Account Net Inflow/Outflow 130-210 (35-85)
Government External Borrowing - 150
Enterprise Capital in 11
Inflows9 150-200 50
Enterprise Debt
Repayment (25) (50-75)
Territorial Enterprise
External Balance
Changes  ^ 20-(10) (50-100)
Increase in RSA Currency .
in circulation (10) (20-30)
Change in Net External
Commercial Credit
Outstanding 25 (20-30)
Capital Flight Neg1 (90-100)
Notes:
1. All estimates adjusted to include Walvis Bay. Goods, non-factor services 
imports, recorded interest/dividends, government/railways transfer 
receipts estimated with some degree of accuracy. Other items highly 
speculative.
2. Narrowly defined.
continued ....../
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3. Probably seriously incomplete.
4. Adjusted for probable R20 million underestimation in provision 1983 
official estimates.
5. Not readily separable from enterprise external balance changes.
6. If savings held with Namibian financial institution impossible to 
separate accurately from enterprise external balance changes.
7. Railways R20 million 1977, R70 million 19 8 3. Both government and 
railways include capital account transfers as well as recurrent, 
government transfers include R55 and R275 million for 1977 and 1983 
respectively (adjusted to include all of Namibia).
8. Includes parastatals other than railways. Includes loan and equity 
capital inflows.
9. Dominated by Rossing/Otjihase mine development.
10. Probably largely mineral exploration.
11. Largely external loan payments by Rossing in 1983*
12. See Notes 5 and 6. Includes head office account balances of branches.
( ) means increase in net external claims.
13. Because RSA - not Namibian - currency is used in Namibia, increased 
currency circulation de facto represents a capital outflow (purchase of 
external asset).
14. ( ) means reduction in external commercial credit used.
15. ( ) means outflow. Highly speculative and if via shifting financial
institution accounts almost impossible to disentangle from enterprise 
external balance changes.
Sources:
Statistical/Economic Review 1982, 1983} Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen, 
Namibia: The Last Colony, Tables 14, 17, 20; various micro estimates. In 
both years exports adjusted to include new data on probable tourism
receipts (see Chapter Wildlife and Tourism UNIN, 1986) and to take toll
smelting receipts into account.
Table 5
A. 1983/8^4 Consolidated Territorial Budget (R 000,000) 1
Total Expenditure 1,300
Recurrent 1,050
Capital 200
Total Finance 
Revenue 
Gap
h m
6750
500
By Category By Category
Second Tier Indirect (3 6 0)
Central Budget 285 Custom Excise 275
Own Revenue 2150 Sales Tax 85
Central Admin’stn. 40 Direct (215)
'Debt* Service 76 Mining Taxes 75
Other Financial Other Company tax 35
Transfers 79 Dividend Remittance Tax 10
Defence 713 Personal Income Tax 1457
Police 533 Other (175)
Agriculture 70 Service Charges and Rates 140
Transport 91 Fees, Licences, etc. 35
Water 56 Subtotal 750
Education 42 (1 2 2 )M RSA Transfer 275
Health 32 (8 2 )^ Borrowing 195
Walvis Bay 114 Residual 30
Other5 141 Total 1 ,3 0 0
Total 1 ,3 0 0
Notes:
1. Adjusted to cover Walvis Bay plus Second Tier and Municipal expenditure 
from own revenue.
2. Dominantly white Second Tier and Windhoek.
3 . Excludes expenditure on RSA Budget. Also excludes ’home guards’ etc., on 
second tier budgets.
44. Including ’Second Tier'funding purportedly spent on these heads.
5. Includes municipal budget guesstimates.
6 . Includes Walvis Bay, Second Tier, Municipal.
7. Collected by Second Tier. Indirect tax revenue is aggregated into RSA 
Revenue Estimates.
Sources: 1983/84 Budget Estimates adjusted on the basis of fragmentary data
on Seconc ’ier, Municipal, Walvis Bay expenditure and revenue; Thomas, W. H., 
"Namibia 1985: A New Start", address 3-VI-85 at Klein Windhoek.
B. 1984-851
Expenditure
Second Tier Central Budget 
2Own Revenue
Central Administration
oJustice and Police-1 
Defence^
’Debt' Service 
Other Financial
ii
National Education (135) 
National Health (75)M 
Water Affairs 
Agriculture
Posts, Telecommunications 
Transport
Economic and Manpower
Others
Total
Recurrent Expenditure 
Capital
6Revenue
Table 5 continued (2)
Budget 
305 
200 
56 
66 
131 
149 
98 
56 
m% i-,
56
46
59
97
96
149
1,580
1,340
240
Estimated
Actual
1,520
Opening Surplus 56 68
Indirect 400 410
Customs/Excise (275)
Sales Tax (125)
Direct 320 340
Mining Tax (105)
Other Company Tax (30)
Personal Income Tax (175)
Dividend Remittance Tax (10)
Other 150 157
Loans Raised 180 220
RSA Transfer Basic 318 318
RSA Transfer Defence 54 54
Total 1,473 1,542
Expenditure 1,580 1,520
7Revenue 875 9 12
Gap 705 608
continued,
Notes:
1 - 6. See 12A.
7. Excludes Opening Surplus, RSA Transfers, Loans Raised.
Sources: See 12A and Dirk Mudget, Budget Speech, 5-VII-85.
Table 5 continued (3)
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